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ABSTRACT 
 
The world financial crisis that started in 2007 had a profound impact on the 
global apparel industry, but at the firm level, the impact of the financial crisis seemed 
to be unevenly distributed.  Several luxury apparel companies, such as Louis Vuitton, 
achieved stable net sales whereas quite a few mass apparel companies, such as GAP, 
experienced significant drop of sales and profits. The study intends to systematically 
compare the financial performance of luxury apparel companies with mass apparel 
companies from 2008 to 2011 to see whether a general pattern of differentiated 
performance exists between these two types of companies as a result of their 
respective business models and the specific impact of the 2008 financial crisis.  
MANOVA test was conducted based on six indices developed under the 
Dupont Strategic Profit Model (including annual growth rate of net sales, annual 
growth rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin percentage, net profit margin, asset 
turnover, and return on assets).  Eight luxury apparel and eight mass apparel 
companies were selected for the purpose of the study.  
The results showed that first, the overall financial performance between luxury 
apparel and mass apparel companies was statistically different from 2008 to 2011.  
Second, luxury apparel and mass apparel companies had different gross margin and 
asset turnover from 2008 to 2011.  Third, there was no evidence showing that luxury 
apparel and mass apparel companies achieved different growth of net sales, growth of 
cost of goods sold and return on assets (ROA) from 2008 to 2011.  Fourth, luxury 
apparel companies outperformed mass apparel companies starting in 2010 in terms of 
net profit margin, indicating more robust post-crisis recovery.  
   The results of the study confirmed the differentiated performance of selected 
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies’ business models.  The findings also 
suggested that luxury apparel companies achieved a more robust post-crisis recovery. 
Additionally, the results suggested that mass apparel companies should not enter the 
luxury apparel market because ROA of luxury apparel companies did not appear to be 
better than mass apparel companies.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic crisis that started in 2008 had a profound impact on the global 
apparel industry (Newbury and Ter Meulen, 2010).  As a result of the financial crisis, 
consumer spending slowed down, which led to a significant decline in retail sales, 
followed by deterioration of financial performance of apparel retailers (Gereffi and 
Frederick, 2010; Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010).  At the firm level, however, impacts 
of the financial crisis seemed to be unevenly distributed.  For example, net sales of 
some luxury apparel companies such as Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH) 
seemed to remain stable since the financial crisis in 2008.  In comparison, mass 
apparel companies such as Gap and Limited Brands experienced a significant drop in 
both net sales and net profits (Barrie, 2009; Hoover’s, 2012a, 2012b; Tungate, 2009).  
It remains a question whether the apparent different financial performance among 
several companies is just a random phenomenon or reflects a more general pattern 
between the luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies since the 2008 
financial crisis.  
This study intends to explore whether luxury apparel companies performed 
better than mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011 as a result of the financial 
crisis.  Results of this study will contribute to the understanding of the sectoral impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis on the apparel market, which has seldom been discussed.  
It will also illustrate the business models of the luxury apparel companies and mass 
apparel companies and suggest the best business model for apparel companies in the 
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post financial crisis era.  
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter provides the literature review that leads to the conceptual model 
for the study.  The first section provides definitions and theories.  Next the differences 
between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies and their different business 
models are suggested.  Lastly, their respective impacts from the financial crisis are 
highlighted.  
 
2.1 Definitions 
In this study, a luxury apparel company refers to a company whose business 
focuses on high quality luxury apparel targeting the wealthy and sold at high price 
points in order to remain exclusive (Okonkwo, 2007).  A mass apparel company refers 
to a company that is known for carrying multiple apparel categories and targets a wide 
audience in the middle-market, selling non-exclusive products (Okonkwo, 2007).   
 Researchers have suggested different definitions of luxury, but most agree that 
it can be defined based on three aspects: 1) social/psychological benefits, 2) price 
point, 3) and product nature (Husic and Cicic, 2009; Vigneron and Johnson, 2004; 
Kapferer and Bastien 2009a; Kuang-peng, Chen, Peng, Hackley, Rungpaka et al., 
2011).   
First, in terms of social/psychological benefits, the ownership and use of 
luxury products allow consumers to feel good about themselves and they are able to 
communicate nonverbally about themselves to their peers and the outside world 
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(Vigneron and Johnson, 2004).  Husic and Cicic (2009) suggested that luxury goods 
bring a sense of esteem to the owner through the display or use of a certain brand 
deemed as luxury and this esteem is separate from any functional value.  Consumers 
have a sense of pride and power when they carry a Gucci purse or wear Prada shoes 
and they want to impress others by showing they are able to afford such products 
(Atwal and Williams, 2009).  Therefore, these consumers are concerned with how 
others perceive them.  Vigneron and Johnson (2004) suggested that consumers can 
fulfill psychological and functional needs through luxury goods and the benefits 
obtained through the psychological fulfillments are the distinguishing factors between 
luxury and non-luxury goods.  Consumers who buy luxury goods do so because they 
can, not because those products are the only products that fulfill that function.  Some 
people are satisfied with an inexpensive, no-name handbag because it provides the 
function of carrying what they need for the day whereas luxury consumers prefer to 
carry a luxury designer bag because it shows their ability to purchase luxury brands 
and serves the function of carrying their daily necessities away from home.   
The social/psychological benefits of purchasing the luxury goods can also be 
explained from the perspective of behavior economics. For example, Thorstein Veblen 
named this ostentatious display of one’s status and wealth through fashion as 
conspicuous consumption in The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) (Kaiser, 2012).  
The study argued that people spent extravagantly on goods visible to others to show 
that they were financially and socially successful (Veblen, 1899).  Veblen’s theory of 
conspicuous consumption correlates with the signaling theory, meaning that the 
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conspicuous consumption is a form of signaling in which the characteristic being 
signaled is wealth (Bird and Smith, 2005).  Signaling in this way, as suggested by 
Veblen, enhanced social status when one’s status was not widely known (Bird and 
Smith, 2005).  This signaling of wealth helped describe a clear difference between 
those with established wealth who did not need to take part in conspicuous 
consumption and those with new wealth who needed to show it off (Bird and Smith, 
2005).   
 Second, in terms of price point, luxury products incorporate premium pricing, 
which means they are typically expensive and not financially accessible to the masses 
(Okonkwo, 2007; Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010).  Prices of luxury products are 
significantly higher than prices of products that are non-luxury with similar features 
(Vigneron and Johnson, 2004).  Keller (2009) suggested that these high prices are 
validated by the established image of prestige that is held by luxury products.   
 Third, luxury is further known to mean high quality.  Consumers expect to 
receive a quality product when making a luxury purchase to justify the high price tag 
(Brun et al., 2008).  Luxury objects are typically durable and can increase in value 
over time, such as a Louis Vuitton suitcase (Kapferer and Bastien 2009a; Pendle and 
Stiles, 2009).  The high quality of luxury goods is seen in the quality of the materials 
used and the high level of precision and craftsmanship employed to manufacture the 
goods (Okonkwo, 2007).  
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2.2  Business Models of Luxury Apparel and Mass Apparel Companies 
Business models capture the core of how a business will be focused and how it 
will operate (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005).  The components of business 
models include how the business creates value (product mix, distribution), the target 
market, internal capability factors (production, selling/marketing, packaging, supply 
chain management), competitive strategy factors (service/product quality, customer 
relationships), economic factors (pricing sources, margins, volumes), and investor 
factors (growth strategies, income models) (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005).  
 Because of the unique characteristics of luxury goods, luxury apparel 
companies adopt business models that are different from mass apparel companies.  
These differences are seen in their target markets, pricing strategies, 
marketing/branding strategies, and different degrees of internationalization.  
 First, the target markets of luxury apparel companies and mass apparel 
companies are different.  Luxury apparel companies target the wealthy members of 
society and those signaling wealth who are willing to spend large amounts of money 
on consumer goods (Keller, 2009).  It should be noted that the target market for luxury 
is changing; the rising number of millionaires worldwide has created a new, youthful, 
group of global luxury consumers (Okonkwo, 2007).  China is now the world’s largest 
luxury goods market, Japan makes up a quarter of the world’s luxury goods 
consumption, India’s luxury goods market is growing rapidly, and the luxury goods 
market in Moscow, Russia is worth more than the market in New York (Okonkwo, 
2007).  In comparison, middle-class consumers are the main target market for mass 
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apparel companies (Newbury and ter Meulen, 2010; Lasserre, 2007).  These 
consumers are price sensitive and place a high emphasis on value, but not necessarily 
bargain hunting (Okonkwo, 2007; Driscoll, 2011).   
 Second, the pricing strategy for luxury apparel companies is much different 
than that of the mass apparel companies.  Luxury apparel companies focus on a 
premium pricing strategy with minimal discounts and markdowns because too many 
discounts could tarnish their premium image (Keller, 2009).  They even are known to 
occasionally raise their prices in order to make their products more exclusive and 
increase demand (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009b).  Luxury goods are typically more 
expensive in China due to local taxes that inflate the prices and because of this, many 
Chinese consumers travel to Europe to purchase their luxury products (Sanderson, 
2013).  In response to this rise of Chinese tourists and to increase exclusivity of their 
products in Europe, some luxury companies are raising their prices in Europe, 
including Prada, Louis Vuitton, and Salvatore Ferragamo, an Italian luxury goods 
company (Sanderson, 2013; CPP Luxury, 2013).  Mass apparel companies, on the 
other hand, use markdowns to increase sales and to sell off poorly selling or unsold 
products (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009a).  Often, mass apparel companies need to offer 
discounts to keep their customers and remain competitive (Great American Group, 
2011).  Due to their cost cutting strategy, mass apparel companies are prone to price 
competition (Fratto, Jones, and Cassill, 2006).  Luxury companies focus on high price 
and low volume, whereas mass apparel companies focus on low price, high volume.  
Although luxury apparel companies can be small in revenue as compared to mass 
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apparel companies, they are respected globally with distinguishing reputations 
(Chevalier and Mazzalovo, 2012).  
 Third, branding and marketing strategies are different for luxury apparel and 
mass apparel companies.  Branding is crucial to the success of apparel companies, but 
particularly to luxury apparel companies who must uphold their premium images; 
weak branding strategies can tarnish their image (Okonkwo, 2007).  Luxury apparel 
companies typically have a high level of global brand awareness and an aspirational 
quality and emotional appeal that set them apart from the crowded mass fashion 
market (Okonkwo, 2007).  It is important for luxury apparel marketing to convey an 
image of quality and authenticity while also selling an experience and aspirational 
lifestyle (Atwal and Williams, 2009).  Many luxury apparel print advertisements try to 
evoke sensuality and communicate with their audience that they can feel good about 
themselves and powerful through the use of luxury goods.  On the other hand, mass 
apparel companies focus more on communicating their low prices and good value, 
rather than an aspirational lifestyle.  Oftentimes, their ads specify low prices and deals 
whereas luxury apparel advertising does not mention prices (Kapferer and Bastien, 
2009a).  As companies that focus on price to differentiate themselves in the market, 
mass apparel companies have intense advertising campaigns that incorporate their 
price advantage and use their competitive prices as their branding strategy (Fratto, 
Jones, and Cassill, 2006).   
Lastly, luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies have different 
degrees of internationalization.  Luxury apparel companies are oftentimes well-known 
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by consumers around the world (Okonkwo, 2007).  They have been focusing on 
entering emerging markets where consumer awareness and demand for their products 
are rapidly increasing (Asaeda, 2012).  For example, many luxury apparel companies 
have grasped the financial benefits from getting access to the lucrative and fast 
growing Asia and Latin America markets (Adendorff, 2012).  Much to the contrary, 
internationalization efforts of mass apparel companies have been less prevalent, 
especially in emerging markets (Driscoll, 2011; Asaeda, 2012).  International 
consumers, particularly those in emerging markets such as China, often favor luxury 
apparel brands over mass apparel brands because the consumption of luxury apparel 
allows them to display their wealth and social status, which is important to them (Gao, 
Norton, Zhang, and To, 2009).  Postrel (2008) also suggested that consumers with 
rising incomes in emerging markets such as China and Russia are so drawn to luxury 
products because “rich people in poor places want to show off their wealth.”  
European luxury apparel companies have had the biggest success in China as fashions 
from these countries are received positively for their style, quality, and high fashion 
appeal, whereas apparel companies from the U.S., particularly mass apparel 
companies, are seen more as casual rather than high fashion, thus they have lower 
penetration in China (Dickson, Lennon, Montalto, Shen and Zhang, 2004).  Entering 
international markets requires knowledge in selecting appropriate sites and 
merchandise assortments, as well as the ability to adopt to the local market (Driscoll, 
2011).  Due to these reasons, mass apparel companies have not placed as high an 
emphasis on entering international markets as have the luxury apparel companies. 
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   2.3 Impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the Apparel Industry 
 The 2008 financial crisis had a significant impact across all industries, but 
particularly had a significant impact on the apparel retail industry (Staritz, 2011).  The 
immediate cause of the financial crisis was the subprime lending by banks and the 
burst of the housing bubble (Friedman, 2011).  Bankers who used borrowed money to 
buy risky subprime securities also caused and accelerated the crisis (Friedman, 2011; 
Bragues, 2010).  The U.S. was heavily affected by this financial crisis; unemployment 
in this country increased, and reached a peak of 10.1% in October 2009 (Driscoll, 
2011).  This caused the apparel industry to suffer by leading to diminished consumer 
spending and a decline in international trade.  As retailers experienced reduced sales, 
global suppliers were negatively affected due to reduced demand.  Apparel imports to 
the U.S. decreased by 3.3% in 2008 and 12% in 2009 (Staritz, 2011).  Apparel imports 
to the European Union were also negatively affected and decreased by 5.2% in 2009 
(Staritz, 2011).  Apparel retailers in the U.S. in particular experienced decreased 
revenues, slow inventory turnover, and tight cash flows (Staritz, 2011).  In 2008, U.S. 
department store sales declined 13.3% and specialty apparel retailer sales declined 
10.4% from November 2007-November 2008 (Rosenbloom, 2008).  U.S. apparel 
companies experienced from 3% to 15% decline in sales in 2009 (Driscoll, 2011).  
  In addition to the general decline, there was also a widening income gap, a 
change in consumer behavior and purchase intention, and dual speed recovery in 
developed and emerging economies.  Luxury apparel and mass apparel companies 
were affected differently from these suggested impacts of the financial crisis.  
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First, the financial crisis strengthened the widening income gap (Lowrey, 
2012).  From 2007 to 2009, those with the top incomes experienced a drastic 15.6% 
decline, but from 2009 to 2011, the annual wages of the top 1% grew 8.2% (Mishel 
and Finio, 2013).  The annual wages of the bottom 90% have continued to decrease 
since the financial crisis (Mishel and Finio, 2013).  From 2007 to 2009, the income 
gap became less apparent, but then widened again from 2009 to 2011 during the 
recovery (Mishel and Finio, 2013).  The income gap between the richest 20% in the 
U.S. and the rest of the country is growing (Tavernise, 2012).  A cause of the 
widening income gap is consumers in the middle class have suffered more than the 
luxury consumers throughout the post-financial crisis recovery (Driscoll, 2011).  The 
luxury consumers have bounced back from the recession and are even getting richer, 
whereas the middle class is declining, thus shrinking the customer base for mass 
apparel companies (Tavernise, 2012).  Despite the slow economic growth in 
developed countries, the luxury apparel market is growing and is expected to continue 
to grow as consumers in emerging markets, particularly China and Brazil, experience 
rising incomes and growing desire for luxury goods (PR Newswire, 2012).  
Second, the economic crisis caused a change in consumer behavior and 
purchase intention.  Consumers have become more sophisticated and retailers have 
needed to change strategies in order to please these more discerning customers who 
want lower prices and better value; since the recession, customers have realized that 
they can survive off less, thus it is crucial for companies to market themselves as 
having the best value to please their target market (Apparel Online, 2011).  Across all 
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sectors of the industry, consumers have become more restrained in their spending and 
the industry is experiencing a “new normal” (Driscoll, 2011).  Luxury apparel 
customers, however, are not as affected by price as middle-income customers, who 
were more negatively affected by the financial crisis (Driscoll, 2011).  The mass 
apparel retailers which target the middle market consumers have been at risk as 
consumers have been shopping for either discount goods or luxury goods (Asaeda, 
2012).  Although luxury apparel consumers still purchased during the recession, they 
did not purchase multiple items, but very selectively bought single items (Reyneke, 
2010).  Luxury consumers cut back, but did not completely disappear during the 
financial crisis.   
Third, dual speed recovery refers to the phenomenon that some emerging 
market economies are recovering more quickly than developed economies that are still 
struggling, with some even declining (Pardede, 2011).  In 2010, developing countries 
grew 7.3%, whereas high-income countries grew only 3% (Canuto, 2012).  Emerging 
markets are becoming wealthier and spending their money on luxury products.  
Chevalier and Mazzalovo (2012) suggested that the substantial growth of the luxury 
fashion business in the developing countries of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) is due to their increasing number of wealthy citizens and the rising awareness 
and availability of luxury brands.  Chinese tourists in particular are driving the 
demand for luxury goods as their economy increases (Driscoll, 2011).  In 2011, 
Chinese consumption of luxury goods accounted for over 20% of the global luxury 
market (Asaeda, 2012).  Luxury apparel companies looking to expand their business 
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are entering emerging markets and tapping into the growing wealth of consumers in 
these countries.  These impacts of the financial crisis helped lead to different financial 
performances between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Conceptual Model and Hypothesis 
Luxury apparel and mass apparel companies have different business models in 
terms of their target markets, pricing strategies, marketing/branding strategies, and 
degrees of internationalization.  Effects of the financial crisis, which seemed to favor 
luxury apparel companies, include the widening income gap, change in consumer 
behavior and purchase intention, and dual speed recovery in developed and emerging 
economies.  Based on these aspects, as proposed in Figure 1, this study hypothesizes 
that luxury apparel companies performed better than mass apparel companies in the 
2008 financial crisis.   
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Figure 1.  
Proposed Conceptual Model 
  
Effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the apparel 
retail industry 
• Widening income gap 
• Consumer behavior and purchase intention 
• Dual speed recoveries  
Hypothesis:  
It is hypothesized that luxury apparel and mass apparel 
companies performed differently in the 2008 financial crisis 
because of their different business models and specific effects 
of the crisis.  
Different business models between luxury apparel 
and mass apparel companies 
• Target market 
• Pricing strategy 
• Marketing and branding strategy 
• Degree of internationalization  
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3.2 Company Selection 
Despite numerous research studies on luxury companies, there is no official list 
of luxury apparel companies that could be used directly by this study.  To create such 
a list, as the first step, names of luxury companies were collected from three sources: 
World Luxury Association (2012), Interbrand (2008), and Okonkwo (2007).  World 
Luxury Association is the world’s largest non-profit organization of research and 
management for luxury brands; Interbrand has been widely cited in related studies that 
measure brand value (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009b; James, 2011); and Okonkwo 
(2007) is a comprehensive study of the luxury fashion industry.  As shown in Table 1, 
22 companies were included in this preliminary list, which covered most of the well-
known luxury brands in the world.  
Because this study focused on luxury apparel companies only while the 
preliminary compiled list also included companies in other sectors, such as jewelry 
and automobiles, the second step was to filter the list of companies.  This was done 
based on whether the company fell under the apparel category in the Hoover’s 
database.  Due to availability of data, the list was also limited to only publicly traded 
companies.  The Hoover’s database was used to access the financial information for 
the companies because it is considered “the world’s leading source of commercial 
information and insight on businesses” (Dun & Bradstreet, 2012).  
In order to make the sample more representative, the competitors of each 
luxury company were added to the list so long as they also fell under the apparel 
category and were publicly traded.  Altogether, three companies were added: Michael 
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Kors (competitor of Burberry, Gucci, LVMH, and Prada), Hugo Boss (competitor of 
Gucci, LVMH, and Prada), and Mulberry (competitor of Burberry, Gucci, Hermès, 
LVMH, and Prada).  Since these three companies were considered competitors of the 
top luxury apparel companies, their inclusion in the list for this research was justified.  
The list of luxury companies was adjusted due to lack of available data. 
Michael Kors was removed from the luxury company list because its complete 
financial data from 2008 to 2011 was not available on the Hoover’s database since its 
IPO was in 2011; the only information available was its 2010−2011 revenue.  The 
only annual report available on the company’s website was for 2012.  Prada’s net sales 
and cost of goods sold for 2007 were not available on Hoover’s or the Prada financials 
website.  Net sales for 2007 were found in Plunkett’s Retail Industry Almanac (2009), 
a detailed and comprehensive study on retail trade.  All other financial figures for 
Prada were acquired from the company’s financial reports.  The 2007 numbers for 
Christian Dior were not available from Hoover’s but were found through the 
company’s own financial reports available on its website.  The final list of luxury 
apparel companies for the purpose of this research, as shown in Table 1, included 
eight companies: PPR (parent company of Gucci, which has changed its name to 
Kering), LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy), Hermès, Prada, Burberry, Christian 
Dior, Hugo Boss, and Mulberry.   
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Table 1. 
Luxury Apparel Company Selection 
 
Data source: World Luxury Association (2012), Interbrand (2008), Okonkwo (2007), 
and Hoover’s (2012)  
  
 
Company 
 
Apparel Company 
 
Available Financial 
Data  
 
Chosen for Final List 
Hermès Yes Yes Yes 
Chanel Yes No No 
LVMH Yes Yes Yes 
Gucci Yes Yes Yes 
Christian Dior Yes Yes Yes 
Ferragamo No Yes No. Categorized by 
Hoover's database as 
shoe company 
Versace Yes No No 
Prada Yes Yes Yes 
Fendi Yes Yes  No. Part of LVMH 
Giorgio Armani Yes No No 
Ermenegildo Zegna Yes No No 
Rolex No No No 
Tiffany & Co No Yes No 
Cartier No Yes  No 
Ferrari No Yes  No 
Bulgari No Yes  No 
Burberry Yes Yes Yes 
Patek Philippe No No No 
Michael Kors Yes No No 
 
Hugo Boss Yes Yes Yes 
Mulberry Yes Yes Yes 
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 To show the growing sales of luxury apparel companies in emerging markets, 
particularly Asia, compared to the EU and the Americas, annual reports for each 
company selected were accessed.  In Table 2, revenues for 2008 and 2011 were 
reported, as this was the starting year and ending year for the study respectively.  
Since PPR and LVMH are large conglomerates, it should be noted that the PPR 
numbers reported for this table represent the company’s Luxury Division and the 
LVMH numbers represent its Fashion and Leather Goods Division; for each company, 
these are their largest divisions (PPR, 2012; LVMH, 2012). The numbers for the other 
companies represent them as a whole.  Prada did not have available its 2008 annual 
report; instead, the 2009 numbers were reported.  Mulberry did not specify emerging 
markets in its 2008 annual report, but noted the other region as “rest of world.”  From 
this table, it is apparent that each luxury apparel company selected has increased its 
share in emerging markets, with emphasis on expansion in Asia.   
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Table 2.  
Luxury Apparel Company Revenue by Region, 2008 and 2011 
 
 
Company 
2008 2011 
EU & 
Americas 
Emerging 
Markets (Asia) 
EU & 
Americas 
Emerging 
Markets (Asia) 
PPR 59% 23% 50% 32% 
LVMH 48% 25% 46% 32% 
Hermès 57% 18% 53% 28% 
Prada 61% 26% 55% 35% 
Burberry 75% 21% 59% 33% 
Christian Dior 61% 20% 55% 27% 
Hugo Boss 88% 12% 83% 15% 
Mulberry 92% 8% 86% 13% 
 
Data source: PPR (2009), PPR (2012), LVMH (2009), LVMH (2012), Hermès (2009), 
Hermès (2012), Prada (2010), Prada (2012), Burberry (2009), Burberry (2012), 
Christian Dior (2009), Christian Dior (2012), Hugo Boss (2009), Hugo Boss (2012), 
Mulberry (2009), Mulberry (2012) 
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Similar to the case for the luxury apparel companies, no direct list of mass 
apparel companies is available to use for the purpose of this study.  To create such a 
list, Speer (2012) was first consulted.  Prepared by Apparel Magazine, Speer (2012) 
included 50 publicly traded apparel companies with at least $100 million in annual 
global sales.  Because of the large sales revenue, companies on the list represented the 
most influential mass apparel companies in the market.  However, Speer (2012) 
included mass apparel companies with a wide variety of retail formats, target markets, 
and branding strategies, some of which were very different from luxury apparel 
companies.  To make the comparison meaningful, this study only selected those mass 
apparel companies that carry multiple apparel categories (as opposed to a category 
killer) and those that target a wide target market (as opposed to a narrow market, i.e. 
teenagers).  Additionally, some companies (such as Body Central and Express) were 
excluded from the study because of the unavailability of their complete financial data 
from 2008 to 2011.  Eventually, eight mass apparel companies which met all the 
requirements were chosen: Limited Brands, Ralph Lauren, Urban Outfitters, Chico’s, 
GAP, Ann Inc., Guess, and Perry Ellis.  These are shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3.  
Mass Apparel Company Selection 
 
Company Apparel 
Company 
Retail 
Format 
Compatible 
to Luxury 
Companies 
 
Available 
Financial 
Data 
Chosen for Final List 
Zuoan Yes No Yes No  (different retail 
format) 
lululemon athletica Yes No  Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
The Buckle Yes No  Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Francesca’s 
Collections 
Yes No No No  
 
Casual Male Retail 
Group 
Yes No  Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
 
True Religion 
Jeans 
Yes No  Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
 
Nike Yes No  Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Jos. A Bank 
Clothiers 
Yes No  Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Ralph Lauren Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Guess? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VF Corp. Yes No  Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Limited Brands Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Urban Outfitters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The Cato Corp. Yes No  Yes No (different retail 
format)  
Express Yes Yes No No  
UniFirst No No Yes No  
Zumiez Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Body Central Yes No No No  
Under Armour Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Nordstrom Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Cintas Corp. No No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Chico’s FAS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Columbia Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
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Sportswear category) 
Ascena Retail 
Group 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
HanesBrands Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Gap Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maidenform 
Brands 
Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Carter’s Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
PVH Corp. Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
rue21 Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
The Warnaco 
Group 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
The Men’s 
Wearhouse 
Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
American Eagle 
Outfitters 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format)  
The Children’s 
Place 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Ever-Glory 
International 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Destination 
Maternity 
Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
G-III Apparel  
Group 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
G&K Services No No Yes No 
Ann Inc. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Oxford Industries Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
 
Superior Uniform 
Group 
Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Delta Apparel Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co. 
Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Aeropostale Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Levi Strauss & Co. Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
Perry Ellis  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wet Seal Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Stage Stores Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Stein Mart Yes No Yes No (different retail 
format) 
Wacoal Yes No Yes No (narrow product 
category) 
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Annual reports of the mass apparel companies selected from 2008 and 2011 
were accessed to report the revenue distribution by region, specifically that of the EU 
and the Americas compared to emerging markets, particularly Asia.  Based on the 
numbers in Table 4, it is suggested that the mass apparel companies have not been 
emphasizing expansion in the emerging markets compared to the luxury apparel 
retailers.  In 2011, only three mass apparel companies studied reported revenue in 
emerging markets, whereas all the luxury apparel companies reported sales in these 
regions.  It should be noted that Perry Ellis did not provide a breakdown of revenue by 
region for either year.   
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Table 4. 
 
Mass Apparel Company Revenue by Region, 2008 and 2011 
 
 
 
 
Company 
2008 2011 
EU & 
Americas 
Emerging 
Markets (Asia) 
EU & 
Americas 
Emerging 
Markets (Asia) 
Limited Brands 100% N/A 100% N/A 
Ralph Lauren 92% N/A 86% 14% 
Urban Outfitters 100% N/A 100% N/A 
Chico’s 100% N/A 100% N/A 
Gap 86% 7% 80% 8% 
Ann Inc. 100% N/A 100% N/A 
Guess 83% 6% 87% 8% 
Perry Ellis N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Data Source: Limited Brands (2009), Limited Brands (2012), Ralph Lauren (2009), 
Ralph Lauren (2012), Urban Outfitters (2009), Urban Outfitters (2012), Chico’s 
(2009), Chico’s (2012), Gap (2009), Gap (2012), Ann Inc. (2009), Ann Inc. (2012), 
Guess (2009), Guess (2012), Perry Ellis (2009), Perry Ellis (2012) 
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3.3 Measurement of Company Performance 
 This study adopted the Dupont Strategic Profit Model (DSPM) to measure the 
performance of luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies.  Developed by 
the Dupont Corporation, DSPM is one of the most popular tools used in the business 
world to systematically and comprehensively analyze the financial performance of a 
company (Stapleton, Hanna, Yagla, Johnson, & Markussen, 2002).  DSPM served the 
purpose of this study by analyzing the financial performances of the two categories of 
companies, specifically their profitability and productivity.  The model depicts how 
return on assets is a function of net profit and asset turnover, which measure 
profitability and productivity respectively (Stapleton et al., 2002).  Stapleton et al. 
(2002) used this strategic profit model to analyze six athletic footwear companies and 
how changes to sales, cost of goods sold, variable expenses, inventories, and accounts 
receivable affected the return on net worth for each company.  The strategic profit 
model was applied to each company to pinpoint their individual strengths and 
weaknesses.     
 Based on DSPM, six indices were selected to analyze the performance of 
companies in this study: 
• Growth of net sales.  Net sales refer to the total sales revenue after deductions 
for customer returns and allowances have been made (Easterling, Flottman, Jernigan, 
& Wuest, 2008).  However, net sales are also affected by the size of the companies, 
which may cause biasness in the results, given the various sizes of luxury apparel and 
mass apparel companies selected in Table 1 and Table 2.  Growth rate of net sales was 
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used to eliminate the impact of firm size on the result.  Growth of net sales was 
calculated by subtracting this year’s sales by last year’s sales and dividing by last 
year’s sales.  The value of the growth of net sales reflects the healthiness of companies 
in receiving sales revenue.  A positive growth rate indicates an improvement in 
performance in achieving sales revenue.  A negative growth rate signifies a decline in 
performance of net sales from the previous year.   
• Growth of cost of goods sold.  Cost of goods sold measures the cost of the 
inventory sold during a period and is influenced by the billed cost of merchandise, 
cash discounts, transportation, and workroom costs (i.e. labor) (Ingram and Albright, 
2007; Easterling et al., 2008).  The percent change of cost of goods sold was used to 
evaluate whether their costs increased or decreased each year.  Because the growth of 
cost of goods sold was affected by both the unit price of purchasing and the volume of 
product sold, interpretation of the result shall combine with the growth of net sales.  
• Gross margin is represented by the difference between net sales and cost of 
goods sold (Easterling et al., 2008).  Gross margin percent was reported in this study 
as it showed the gross profit rate, again reducing the biasness that may result from the 
various sizes of the selected companies.  It was calculated by dividing gross margin by 
net sales.  Companies aim for a higher gross margin percent as it represents the more 
money they retain per dollar of sales to cover other costs (Steinmetz & Brooks, 2006).  
An increase in gross margin indicates an improvement in performance, whereas a 
decrease in gross margin indicates a reduction in performance.   
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• Net profit was determined by subtracting operating expenses, net interests, and 
taxes from gross margin (Bisetty, Fourie, Günther, Richards, & Smith, 2009).  Net 
profit is the final profit achieved by sales and is referred to as “the bottom line” (Berry 
& Jarvis, 2006).  A higher net profit percent indicated a company was performing 
financially well; a lower net profit percent indicated a company needed help 
financially and could be losing too much of their revenue to expenses.   
• Asset turnover “indicates how efficiently a company uses its assets to generate 
sales” (Kimmel, Weygandt, & Kieso, 2011).  To calculate this ratio, total assets were 
divided by net sales.  A higher asset turnover indicates a company is selling their 
products quickly to generate sales, and merchandise is not sitting around for long 
periods of time.  Thus, a higher asset turnover indicates strong financial performance, 
whereas a lower ratio indicates weak financial performance.  
• Return on assets (ROA) results from the interaction of net profit and asset 
turnover and helps determine a company’s financial performance in terms of how 
assets generate sales (Stickney, Weil, Schipper, & Francis, 2010).  It relates the 
profitability of a company to the value of the assets used (Stapleton et al., 2002). This 
means it indicates how profitable a company is related to its total assets.  As ROA 
increases, a company’s financial performance increases as well, and as ROA 
decreases, financial performance decreases.   
 Although researchers have reported that signs of the financial crisis started in 
2007, the effects of the crisis were being felt throughout the entire economy by 2008, 
the starting year for the study (Taylor, 2009).  The analysis continued through 2011 to 
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study how the companies performed during and after the financial crisis; this was also 
the last year the latest data was available.  Each company and index was studied 
annually to determine the growth rate for each year and to take each index into 
consideration.  The average levels from 2008 to 2011 were calculated by averaging 
each index throughout the four years.  For example, the average of net profit was 
calculated by adding net profit of each individual company from 2008 to 2011, then 
dividing by four, the number of years studied.  This method calculated the overall 
average for each index from 2008 to 2011 and was done to determine how each 
company performed overall per index.  By looking at the annual performance and 
average performance, patterns over the years could be identified.   
 
3.4 Method of Analysis 
This study adopted multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to evaluate 
the hypothesis, specifically whether the financial performance of luxury apparel and 
mass apparel companies differed from 2008 to 2011.  As shown in Equation 1, 
MANOVA test compared the mean values of the multiple financial indices to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences between the two 
groups (Huberty and Olejnik, 2006).  In this study, MANOVA revealed whether 
financial performance measured by six indices (namely growth rate of net sales, 
growth rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin, net profit, asset turnover and ROA) 
were significantly different in mean value between luxury apparel companies and 
mass apparel companies.  
30	  	  
𝑦!"# = 𝜇!" + 𝜀!"#                                                                                    (1) 
Specifically in Equation 1:  
Dependent variable 𝑦!"# denoted the value of the rth variable (i.e. the six 
indices that measured the firm performance, namely growth rate of net sales, growth 
rate of cost of goods sold, gross margin, net profit, asset turnover, and ROA) for 
observation j (i.e. individual company) in group i (i.e. luxury or mass apparel company 
group). Independent variable 𝜇!" denoted the value of group i for the rth variable; this 
represented the two categories of companies for comparison in this study: luxury 
apparel companies and mass apparel companies.  The last variable denoted the 
residual of the rth variable for observation j in group i.  
The null hypothesis for MANOVA proposed there was no significant 
difference in financial performance, i.e. H0: 𝑢! =   𝜇! =   𝜇! = ⋯   𝜇!.  The alternative 
hypothesis suggested that luxury apparel and mass apparel companies did perform 
differently, meaning that not all dependent variable values were the same across 
companies and years, i.e, H1: at least two 𝑢! are unequal.  To determine whether to 
accept the null hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis, the answer was based on the 
p-value of Wilks’ Lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotteling-Lawley Trace, and Roy’s Greatest 
Root.  If the p-value was statistically significant, the null hypothesis was rejected; if 
the p-value was not significant, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  In this study, a p-
value of less than 0.05 was determined significant.   
If MANOVA result suggested that financial performance of luxury apparel 
companies and mass apparel companies overall was statistically different, between-
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subject test was further conducted to determine which one(s) of the six indices that 
measure the financial performance of firms led to the statistical significance of 
MANOVA (Lu, 2012).  
MANOVA and between-subject test were conducted from 2008 to 2011 both 
annually and on average to evaluate financial performance from the beginning of the 
economic crisis up to the year in which the most recent data was available and to 
evaluate the overall performance throughout the years.  MANOVA was conducted 
using the SAS statistical software package.  
Annual reports for each company were accessed to provide explanations of the 
strategies used by the individual companies in terms of merchandise mix, domestic 
and international growth as well as detailed information regarding their financial 
performance.  This information helped provide insight into the strengths and 
weaknesses for each company.   
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The average performance of luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 
2008 to 2011 are shown in Table 5, and described as follows.  Figures 2 through 7 
represent each financial index over the time period studied.   
First, neither the luxury apparel companies nor the mass apparel companies 
showed a clear pattern of net sales growth over the examined period.  According to 
Table 5, although net sales of luxury apparel companies suffered a sharper decline 
than the mass apparel companies in 2008, luxury apparel companies enjoyed faster 
rebound in 2010.  Net sales of luxury apparel companies decreased 3.43% in 2008 
whereas net sales of mass apparel companies increased 1.13%.  During 2009, luxury 
apparel net sales increased almost 2% whereas mass apparel net sales decreased 2.5%.  
In 2010, luxury apparel net sales increased 21.88% and mass apparel net sales 
increased 10.75%.  Both luxury apparel and mass apparel companies experienced 
increases in net sales in 2011, 16% and 12% respectively.   
The net sales fluctuation was even more significant at the firm level.  For 
example, net sales of Mulberry and Burberry, two luxury companies, decreased 18% 
and 14% respectively in 2008, but increased 80% and 35% in 2010 respectively.  In 
2008, Mulberry used retained profits and cash flow to invest in the opening of new 
shops and increased its marketing expenditures (Mulberry, 2009).  Net sales increased 
significantly for Mulberry in 2010 due to their increased investment in Asia and 
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Europe.  The company opened new stores in Athens, Korea, Singapore, and the 
Helsinki airport (Mulberry 2011).  Burberry, in 2008, experienced decline in their 
wholesale revenue in Spain and certain licenses, mostly in menswear, were not 
renewed which significantly reduced revenue (Burberry, 2009).  In 2010, increased 
market share in the US, the Middle East, and Asia helped Burberry improve net sales 
that year (Burberry, 2011).  In 2008, Urban Outfitters and Guess, two mass apparel 
companies, increased 22% and 20% in net sales respectively.  Urban Outfitters 
attributed its growth to new store net sales and direct-to-consumer net sales; the 
company opened 49 new stores that year (Urban Outfitters, 2009).  In 2008, Guess 
reported that its European and licensing businesses helped accelerate its revenue 
growth; the company also opened 20 free-standing stores in China that year (Guess, 
2009).  At the opposite end, Limited Brands, a mass apparel company experienced an 
11% decrease in net sales in 2008 due to reduced consumer spending caused by the 
financial crisis (Limited Brands, 2009).  Ann Inc. reported an almost 17% decline in 
net sales in 2009 due to a product assortment that did not appeal to their customers and 
high costs associated with the company’s strategic restructuring (Ann Inc., 2009).  The 
following years saw growth again for both luxury apparel and mass apparel 
companies.  
Second, growth of cost of goods sold did not show a clear pattern for either the 
luxury apparel companies or mass apparel companies.  It was lower for luxury apparel 
companies in 2008, 2011, and the average of the four years.  In 2009, it was negative 
for both luxury apparel and mass apparel companies, meaning that it decreased for 
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both from 2008.  Growth rate of cost of goods sold increased for both in 2010; 10.13% 
for luxury apparel and 9.38% for mass apparel companies.  This increase was 
attributable to the rise in net sales.  In 2011, it was higher for mass apparel companies, 
15.38%, whereas it was 9.50% for luxury apparel companies. 
Third, gross margin of luxury apparel and mass apparel companies was 
noticeably different, specifically luxury apparel companies achieved a higher gross 
margin on average due to their higher markups.  It increased every year for luxury 
apparel but for mass apparel companies, it increased from 2008 to 2010, and then 
slightly decreased in 2011.  At the company level, Urban Outfitters reported a 6% 
drop in gross profit from 2010 to 2011 and attributed this decrease to an increase in 
markdowns to clear inventory that was moving slowly (Urban Outfitters, 2012).  Gap 
reported a 4% decrease in gross profit from 2010 to 2011 but did not disclose a reason 
why in their 2011 annual report.  A big difference in gross margin was evident in 2011 
when the highest gross margin for a luxury apparel company was 72% (Prada), and the 
highest gross margin for a mass apparel company was 58% (Ralph Lauren).  The 
average gross margin was 61.88% for luxury apparel and 44.50% for mass apparel 
companies.   
Fourth, luxury apparel companies also achieved higher net profit margin than 
the mass apparel companies during the examined period.  It increased every year for 
luxury apparel companies, whereas for mass apparel companies, it increased from 
2008 to 2010, and then slightly decreased in 2011.  Urban Outfitters experienced a 5% 
decrease in net profit from 2010 to 2011 due to increases in expenses and taxes (Urban 
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Outfitters, 2012).  In 2008, net profit for mass apparel companies was significantly 
lower than luxury apparel companies, 2.5% compared to 8%.  A contributing factor to 
this was that Ann Inc., a mass apparel company, reported a -15% net profit that year 
due to costs associated with the launch of a new strategic restructuring program (Ann 
Inc., 2009).  This company’s average net profit for all four years was -2%, as it still 
experienced costs from the restructuring program.  The average net profit percentages 
were 11.13% and 6% for luxury apparel and mass apparel respectively.   
Fifth, asset turnover was higher for mass apparel companies for each year and 
the average of the years.  Asset turnover for each mass apparel company was over 1.00 
whereas only three luxury apparel companies had asset turnover over 1.00.  These 
companies were Burberry, which implemented a new strategic plan in 2008 focused 
on entering under-penetrated markets and accelerating their retail growth, Hugo Boss, 
and Mulberry (Burberry, 2009).  Mulberry had a high asset turnover due to the 
company’s strong expansion throughout Europe and Asia where in 2010, demand 
exceeded supply (Mulberry, 2010).  Another pattern that was apparent was it 
decreased each year from 2008 to 2010 for both luxury apparel and mass apparel, but 
then increased for both in 2011, due to post-crisis recovery.  The average asset 
turnover for luxury apparel companies was 0.92, whereas for mass apparel companies, 
it was 1.65.   
Lastly, overall, there did not appear to be noticeable patterns in the mean 
performance of ROA.  In 2008, ROA was negative for luxury apparel companies; 
referring back to the original data, this became clear because ROA for Burberry in 
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2008 was -53%, due to the high costs associated with the implementation of its new 
strategic plan (Burberry, 2009).  The average ROA for Burberry was -3.75%.  This 
implies the company was not selling their merchandise at a profitable rate to cover the 
costs associated with its assets.  Ann Inc.’s ROA in 2008 was low as well, at -34%, 
which contributed to the low ROA for mass apparel companies during this year.  This 
low ROA was also due to the high costs incurred from its new strategic plan in 2008.  
ROA for luxury apparel companies was lower in 2008 and 2009, but then increased 
slightly above mass apparel companies in 2010 and remained above in 2011.  The 
averages for ROA for the companies were similar, at 8% for luxury apparel companies 
and 8.5% for mass apparel companies.  
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Table 5.  
 
Mean Performance of Luxury Apparel and Mass Apparel Companies 
 
  Net Sales 
Growth 
Cost of 
Goods Sold 
Growth 
Gross 
Margin 
Net 
Profit 
Asset 
Turnover 
ROA 
2008 Luxury -3.43% -1.43% 58.86% 8.00% 0.94 -1.43% 
Mass 1.13% 3.50% 42.50% 2.50% 1.80 2.25% 
2009 Luxury 1.88% -0.13% 60.00% 8.63% 0.92 6.88% 
Mass -2.50% -7.38% 45.13% 6.25% 1.61 8.88% 
2010 Luxury 21.88% 10.13% 63.25% 13.38% 0.90 11.88% 
Mass 10.75% 9.38% 46.25% 7.88% 1.51 11.63% 
2011 Luxury 16.38% 9.50% 65.13% 13.75% 0.91 13.38% 
Mass 12.00% 15.38% 44.38% 6.75% 1.68 11.13% 
2008-
2011 
Luxury 8.63% 4.63% 61.88% 11.13% 0.92 8.00% 
Mass 5.38% 5.25% 44.50% 6.00% 1.65 8.50% 
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Figure 2.  Net Sales Growth from 2008 to 2011     
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost of Goods Sold Growth from 2008 to 2011 
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Figure 4. Gross Margin from 2008 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Net Profit from 2008 to 2011 
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Figure 6. Asset Turnover from 2008 to 2011 
 
 
Figure 7. ROA from 2008 to 2011 
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It should be noted that Table 5 only showed the mean value of financial 
performances of companies.  Whether or not the financial performances between 
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies was statistically different needed to be 
determined based on the results of MANOVA.   
 
4.2 Results of MANOVA  
MANOVA was conducted first to determine whether significant difference 
existed overall in financial performance during each year and the average of the years 
for the companies.  Results of the MANOVA main effect test are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6.  
 
MANOVA Test Results 
 Wilks’ 
Lambda 
Pillai’s 
Trace 
Hotelling-
Lawley 
Trace 
Roy’s 
Greatest 
Root 
F-Value P-Value 
2008 0.236 0.764 3.237 3.237 4.32 0.031** 
2009 0.201 0.799 3.979 3.979 5.97 0.009** 
2010 0.076 0.924 12.147 12.147 18.22 0.000** 
2011 0.197 0.803 4.072 4.072 6.11 0.008** 
2008-
2011 
0.183 0.817 4.45 4.45 6.67 0.006** 
*: P<0.05; **: P<0.01 
 
From 2008 to 2011 both annually and on average, results of Wilks’ Lambda, 
Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root were statistically 
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significant at 95 percent confidence level (p<0.05).  The results suggest that from 
2008 to 2011, overall financial performance between luxury apparel and mass apparel 
companies was statistically different.  
 
Between-subject test was further conducted to test whether each index 
performed differently between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies within 
each year.  Results of the MANOVA between-subject test are shown in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7.  
 
Between-Subject Test results F-value (P-value) 
 
 Net Sales 
Growth 
Cost of 
Goods Sold 
Growth 
Gross 
Margin 
Net Profit Asset 
Turnover 
ROA 
2008 0.60 
(0.45) 
0.87 
(0.37) 
15.67 
(0.002)** 
1.96 
(0.19) 
7.57 
(0.017)* 
0.13 
(0.73) 
2009 0.57 
(0.46) 
0.98 
(0.34) 
13.82 
(0.002)** 
1.35 
(0.26) 
6.27 
(0.025)* 
0.73 
(0.41) 
2010 1.16 
(0.30) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
19.76 
(0.001)** 
10.54 
(0.006)** 
9.51 
(0.008)** 
0.01 
(0.93) 
2011 0.48 
(0.50) 
1.00 
(0.33) 
22.82 
(0.000)** 
13.00 
(0.003)** 
12.91 
(0.003)** 
0.55 
(0.47) 
2008-
2011 
0.44 
(0.52) 
0.02 
(0.89) 
19.96 
(0.001)** 
6.54 
(0.023)* 
11.33 
(0.005)** 
0.02 
(0.88) 
*: P<0.05; **: P<0.01 
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First, a difference in net sales growth was not supported by the test in any year.  
The p-value for the t-statistics was larger than 0.05 at the 95% confidence level from 
2008 to 2011 both annually and on average.  
 Second, growth of cost of goods sold was not statistically significant for any of 
the years analyzed (p>0.05).  This means there was no statistically significant 
difference in growth of cost of goods sold between luxury apparel and mass apparel 
companies from 2008 to 2011 and the average of the years.   
 Third, gross margin was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level for all the years (p<0.05).  This means that gross margin was significantly 
different between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, as 
well as the average of the four years.   
 Fourth, a difference in asset turnover was also supported by the test (p<0.05).  
This means that asset turnover was statistically significantly different between luxury 
apparel and mass apparel companies for all four years and the average of the years.   
 Fifth, net profit was not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level in 2008 and 2009; however, it was statistically significant in 2010, 2011, and in 
the average of the years.  This means that net profit was not significantly different 
between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies for 2008 and 2009, but it was 
significantly different for 2010, 2011, and the average.   
 Sixth, a difference in ROA was not supported by the test (p>0.05).  This means 
that ROA was not statistically significantly different for luxury apparel and mass 
apparel companies for 2008-2011 and on average.  
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 The study results showed that there was an overall financial difference between 
luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, including the average 
of the four years.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
Results of the MANOVA test can be explained through the following aspects.  
First, the results showed the differentiated performance between luxury apparel 
and mass apparel companies as reflected by the statistical difference in gross margin 
and asset turnover.  Gross margin was higher each year for luxury apparel companies 
than mass apparel companies.  For example, the average gross margin for luxury 
companies from 2008 to 2011 was 61.88%, whereas it was 44.5% for mass apparel 
companies.  Luxury apparel companies are known to have higher markup than mass 
apparel companies, and since gross margin is the money that is kept from sales after 
accounting for costs, companies with higher markups and higher retail prices earn high 
gross margins (Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010; Sable, n.d.).  Asset turnover was higher for 
mass apparel companies each year and the average of the years.  They have higher 
asset turnover because of their competitive pricing with lower price tags than luxury 
apparel.  This leads assets to turn over more quickly as merchandise turns over more 
quickly, thus creating a higher asset turnover.  At the company level, there were 
differences in asset turnover among the companies as variation may exist in terms of 
prices and assortment mix.  For mass apparel companies, average asset turnover 
ranged from 1.15 (Ralph Lauren) to 2.25 (Chico’s).  For luxury apparel companies, 
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average asset turnover had a greater variation, from 0.36 (Christian Dior) to 1.65 
(Mulberry).  Overall average asset turnover for mass apparel companies was 1.65 
whereas it was 0.92 for luxury apparel companies.  Based on the results, it appeared 
that luxury apparel companies have a higher gross margin and lower asset turnover, 
whereas mass apparel companies have a lower gross margin and higher asset turnover. 
Second, the results showed that luxury apparel companies achieved a more 
robust post-crisis recovery than mass apparel companies.  Net sales for luxury apparel 
companies increased significantly in 2010, 21.88%, whereas mass apparel net sales 
increased 10.75%.  Net profit was significantly higher for luxury apparel companies in 
2011, at 13.75%, whereas net profit for mass apparel companies was 6.75%.  Luxury 
apparel customers were becoming confident again about making luxury purchases.  A 
major contributing factor to the growth of the global luxury industry was the rising 
demand from developing markets, particularly China (S&P Dow Jones, 2012; Barrie, 
2009).  
Third, there was no evidence showing that the luxury apparel market was more 
lucrative in terms of return on investments, (ROA).  For example, the overall average 
ROA from 2008 to 2011 was 8% and 8.5% for luxury apparel and mass apparel 
companies respectively.  Although the overall averages were similar, variation existed 
among averages at the company level.  For luxury apparel companies, the average 
ROA ranged from -3.75% (Burberry) to 14.75% (Mulberry); for mass apparel 
companies, the average ROA ranged from -4.25% (Ann Inc.) to 16.25% (Guess?).  
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This suggested that neither luxury apparel nor mass apparel companies outperformed 
each other based on ROA.  
  It should be noted that Ralph Lauren, a mass apparel company in this study, 
operates its lines under a number of price tiers.  Although its premium brands are 
considered in the luxury apparel segment, it does a large amount of business in the 
mass apparel segment as well (Ralph Lauren, 2012).   
  
47	  	  
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Findings 
This study intended to evaluate whether the different business models of 
luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies resulted in the luxury apparel 
companies performing better from 2008 to 2011.  Under the framework of the Dupont 
Strategic Profit Model, financial performance of eight luxury apparel companies and 
eight mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011 were compared against six indices 
by using the MANOVA technique.  The results showed that: 
First, the overall financial performance between luxury apparel and mass 
apparel companies was statistically different from 2008 to 2011. 
Second, luxury apparel companies and mass apparel companies had different 
gross margin and asset turnover from 2008 to 2011.  
Third, there was no evidence showing that the luxury apparel companies and 
mass apparel companies achieved different growth of net sales, growth of cost of 
goods sold and return on assets (ROA) from 2008 to 2011.  
Fourth, luxury apparel companies outperformed the mass apparel companies 
starting in 2010 in terms of net profit margin, indicating a more robust post-crisis 
recovery. 
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5.2 Implications of the Findings 
 Findings of this study have several important implications.  
            First, the results show that the apparel market has been recovering since 2010 
from the financial crisis.  Particularly, the robust performance of the luxury apparel 
companies both in the volume of net sales and in profitability after 2010 implies that 
the luxury customers could have become more confident in spending and/or the luxury 
market is growing globally (S&P Dow Jones, 2012).   
          Second, despite the positive development of the luxury apparel market, results 
of the study suggest that apparel companies should not rush into the luxury market.  
Particularly, ROA of the luxury apparel companies turned out to be no better than the 
mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, even in those years that the luxury 
apparel companies achieved higher net profit margin.  This is largely because the asset 
turnover ratios of the luxury apparel companies were much lower as a result of much 
higher investment in total assets (such as inventory and fiscal property).  On the 
contrary, to keep growing its business, the luxury apparel companies might consider 
purposefully expanding into the mass apparel market so as to reach more consumer 
bases and improve the performance in asset turnover.  Some companies have already 
taken action.  For example, Missoni, a privately-held luxury apparel company, 
collaborated with Target, a discount department store, for a collection that was 
available for only a limited time (Felice, 2011).  The collection was created under the 
Missoni name and featured menswear and womenswear with average price points 
from $30 to $60.   
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          Third, findings of the study suggest diversified business models within the 
group of luxury apparel companies.  For example, the financial performance of 
LVMH, Hermès and Prada appeared to be very different from Burberry in terms of net 
profit margin, asset turnover and return on assets.  It is unclear yet whether the 
differences were due to their specific market focus or product specialization, which 
can be further studied.  
 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Agendas 
Despite the meaningful and interesting results, this study also has several 
limitations that might be overcome in future studies.  
First, due to the availability of data, only publicly traded apparel companies 
were included in the study, although several well-known luxury companies such as 
Chanel, Versace, and Giorgio Armani are privately held.  Reliability of the study 
could be improved if more companies could be included in the analysis.  Additionally, 
PPR and LVMH reported their financial data for the companies as a whole and not 
their fashion and luxury divisions which could affect the results.  
Second, country or market-specific data was not available.  Complete financial 
data for each company per country or specific market is not reported.  This is a 
limitation because studies suggest that a majority of business for luxury apparel 
companies is coming from the growing wealth of emerging markets whereas the 
majority of business for mass apparel companies is coming from the U.S.  Some 
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luxury apparel companies may have more global presence than others.  This could 
affect the result by not being an even comparison.  
Third, the diversity of luxury apparel companies may affect the MANOVA 
results which are sensitive to within-group differences.  For example, Mulberry 
appeared to be much different than the other luxury companies, particularly in terms 
of sales growth, cost of goods sold growth, and asset turnover.    
From this study, future studies can be conducted to analyze and compare the 
financial performances of apparel companies.  As statistical financial performance did 
exist between luxury apparel and mass apparel companies from 2008 to 2011, future 
studies can research whether a statistically significantly difference continues.  Case 
studies can be performed on individual companies to analyze their financial 
performance.  These case studies could study a particular company over a specific 
period of time to analyze its business model, strategic growth, and financial 
performance.  Other studies could focus on apparel companies within individual 
countries or regions to determine their performance per region.  This could provide 
information as to what types of apparel companies perform best in what region, for 
example, whether luxury apparel companies would succeed in a particular region or 
whether the consumers in that region would respond better to mass apparel companies.   
Additionally, a study could compare and contrast luxury apparel companies to other 
retail formats, including department stores or discount stores to determine whether 
there was difference in financial performance from 2008 to 2011 between other retail 
formats.   
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